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I. INTRODUCTION

Largely unnoticed by society, a new era for technology emerged. This
era promises increased innovation for product manufacture, new
techniques for improved human health and cognitive abilities, and the
integration of fundamental molecular manufacturing research into the
development of consumer products.' Ideas and technology that were once
characterized as belonging exclusively to the realm of science fiction are
now "science reality" as scientists developed novel techniques to
manipulate matter. We are in the nanotechnology age for science and
technology.

1. M.C. Roco, The New Engineering World, MECHANICAL ENGINEERING (Apr. 2005).

2007]

PATENT INEQUITY?: RETHINKING THE APPLICATION OF STRICTUABILITY TO PATENT LAW

181

Nanotechnology is an emerging field that concerns the development
and use of objects, systems, mechanisms, and assemblies between 1 and
100 nanometers in size.2 A nanometer is one billionth of a meter; thus
nanotechnology is the application of science to processes that are taking
place at the scale of one billionth of a meter up to one-hundred billionths
of a meter.3 For perspective, consider that an average human hair is
100,000 nanometers in diameter. In addition to this imperceptible size, the
construction of technology at the nanoscale level requires novel
manufacturing processes. Unlike traditional "top-down" manufacturing in
which blocks of raw material are cast and machined into precisely-formed
products, nanotechnology is the science and technology of building things
one atom or molecule at a time.4 Scientists and researchers herald this
"bottom-up" technique as a more efficient form of engineering since the
functions of devices are based on the inherent chemical and physical
properties of the assembled configurations.5 It allows large complicated
structures to be designed atom-by-atom for desired characteristics using
properties and design rules seen in nature.6
The general consensus is that nanotechnology is "the next big thing,"
directors are beginning to exploit the cache of the term
and marketing
"nano."7 The U.S. National Science Foundation predicts that the market
for nanotechnology products will reach $1 trillion within 10 to 15 years.8
In 2001, Congress passed the 21 st Century Nanotechnology Research and
Development Act, creating the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI)
to "coordinate the multiagency effort in nanoscale science, engineering,

2. Vicki Norton, WhatNanotechnology MeansforlP,MANAGING INTELLECTUALPROPERTY
(June 2003), http://managingip.com/Article.aspx?ArticlelD=1255716&Title=What%20
nanotechnology/o20means%20for/o2OIP (last visited Sept. 20, 2007); see also Jonathan A.
Muenkel et al., Staking a Claim in the Nanoworld, http://library.findlaw.com/2004/May/13/
133430.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
3. Barry Newberger, PresentationTranscripts:IntellectualPropertyandNanotechnology,
11 "TEx.INTELL. PROP. L.J. 649, 650 (2003).
4. Glenn Reynolds, Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: Three Futures, 17 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 179, 181 (2003).
5. Id. at 183-87.
6. U.S. Department of Energy, The Beauty of Nanoscale Science, available at
www.science.doe.gov/Sub/OccasionalPapers/3-Occ-Nanoscale-Science.PDF
7. See, e.g., Apple's Ipod Nano and Creative's Zen Nano Plus MP3 players.
8. Donald Featherstone & Michael Specht, Nanotechnology Patents: A Snapshot of
NanotechnologyPatentingThrough an Analysis of 10 Top Nanotech Patents, 16 INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J. 19, 19 (2004).
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and technology."9 Early in 2007, the Executive Office of the President
released a budget prospectus that provides over $1.5 billion for the NNI,
bringing the total investment since the NNI was established to $8 billion.'°
In fact, total private and public U.S. investment into nanotechnology
hovers around $11.8 billion." Major projects in nanoscience and
nanotechnology are taking place in universities, government laboratories,
and private companies. Large corporations in the United States and around
the world 12 are gearing up for the nanotechnology boom by investing
heavily in research and development (R&D) efforts to help fuel new
nanotechnology-related advances in real world applications. 3 It comes as
no surprise that the number of U.S. patent applications related to
nanotechnology-based inventions grew from 250 to over 5500 between
1995 and 2003.'4
Although more than 130 products currently on the market use
nanotechnology, 5 the promise of nanotechnology lies in its future
applications. In 2003, the National Institute of Health (NIH) stated that
nanotechnology has the potential to radically increase our options for
prevention and treatment of disease through targeted drug delivery systems
for anti-cancer drugs.' 6 In the long term, some researchers envision nano-

9. James D. Thayer, The SPSAgreement: Can It Regulate Trade in Nanotechnology?, 9
(2005) (citing NNI, About the NNI, at http://www.nano.gov/html/about/homeabout.html (last
visited Dec. 6, 2007)).
10. Executive Office of the President, National Nanotechnology Initiative: Research and
Development Funding in the President's 2007 Budget (Mar. 15, 2006), www.ostp.gov/html/
budget/2007/lpgerNNI.pdf; see also Executive Office of the President, NationalNanotechnology
Initiative FY 2008 Budget & Highlights, at http://www.nano.gov/NNIFY08_budget_
summary-highlights.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2007).
11. Press Release, Luxresearch, Nanotechnology Moves from Discovery to
Commercialization: $50 Billion in 2006 Product Sales, $12 Billion in Funding (Nov. 20,2007), at
http://www. luxresearchinc.com/press/2007-lux-research-nanotech-report-5.pdf.
12. Companies that are investing heavily in nanotechnology include: General Electric,
Lucent, Phillips, Motorola, Matsushita, Intel, Advanced Micro Devices, IBM, Tokyo Electron Ltd.,
Infereon, Hewlett Packard, General Motors, Merrill Lynch, and many pharmaceutical companies.
13. Robert Voigt & Edward Mickelson, Nanotechnology-RelatedInventions:Infringement
Issues, 2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 45, 46 (2005).
14. Louis Troilo, Patentability and Enforcement Issues Related to Nanotechnology
Inventions, 2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 36, 37 (2005).
15. Examples of first generation nanotechnology products include sunscreens, cosmetics,
tennis balls, stain-free clothing and textiles, and hard drives. Voigt & Mickelson, supra note 13,
at 46.
16. Id. at 46; Wei Zhou, Ethics of Nanotechnology at the Frontline, 19 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 481, 483 (2003); National Cancer Institute Alliance for
Nanotechnology in Cancer, Nanoparticles Transport Cancer-KillingDrug Into Tumor Cells in
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robots that are capable of navigating throughout the body, repairing tissue
and injuries, destroying tumors,
removing atherosclerotic plaques, and
17
therapy.
gene
performing
even
But for all the presence and promise of nanotechnology, the inherent
nature of nanotechnology may lead to unprecedented issues for the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). One such concern is the potential for
infringement should proprietary nanoscale particles inadvertently fall into
the possession of others. Assume, for example, that a future therapeutic
form of nanotechnology for individuals that suffer from heart disease
involves the use of self-assembling or self-replicating nano-robots that
cruise through arteries to cut-away plaques. In the event that one of these
nano-robots is inadvertently transferred from a licensed user of such
nanotechnology to another by transfer means, such as sexual contact,
kissing, needle-sharing, blood transfusion, or simply a sneeze, may the
unwitting possessor be liable for infringement? Under the current patent
statute, any person who makes, uses, or sells a patented invention is
strictly liable for infringement, regardless of any intention to so possess. 18
Therefore, an inadvertent possessor who comes into possession of
proprietary technology through no fault, or even an affirmative act, of their
own may be found to infringe. It is questionable whether this rule complies
with the purposes of patent protection. Patent protection is intended to
provide a patentee with the ability to control who may capture the benefits
of his invention. 9 Is this goal furthered by making a passive possessor,
who derives no benefit from the patented technology and may in fact
suffer harm, liable to the patentee for infringement?
This Article examines the infringement laws of the patent statute in the
context of nanotechnology. It suggests that staunch application of the
current strict liability standard for patent infringement to nanotechnology
will presumptively result in inadvertent, inequitable, and uneconomical
infringement suits, which are contrary to the purposes of patent protection
and the economic efficiency of strict liability. This Article further suggests
that strengthening the notice requirement in the patent law may mitigate
this foreseeable conclusion. Part H compares the unique characteristics of
nanotechnology to traditional technology. Part Ill examines the theories
and goals of patent protection, and suggests that liability for inadvertent

Mice to IncreaseEfficacy, Lower Drug Toxicity (June 15, 2005), available at http://nano.cancer.

gov/newscenter/nanotechnews_2005-06-1 5.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
17. Zhou, supra note 16, at 484.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003).
19. Hilary Preston, Drift of PatentedGenetically Engineered Crops: Rethinking Liability

Theories, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1153, 1169 (2003).
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infringement is not supported by traditional doctrines of patent protection.
Part IV discusses the origin and development of the strict liability regime,
its economic rationale in the law, and its limitations when applied to the
nanotechnology patent context. Part V proposes amending the patent
statute to strengthen the notice requirement thereby preventing
infringement by innocent possession. Finally, Part VI proposes the
possibility of imposing liability on manufacturers that fail to provide the
necessary controls under tort theories of liability.
II. WHAT Is NANOTECHNOLOGY?: DISTINGUISHING NANOTECH
FROM TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY

The NNI defines nanotechnology as possessing the following
characteristics: (1) "research and technology development at the atomic,
molecular or macromolecular levels, in the length scale of approximately
1-100 nanometer range;" 2 (2) "creating and using structures, devices and
systems that have novel properties and functions because of their small
and/or immediate size;" and (3) "the ability to control or manipulate
[matter] on the atomic scale.",2 1 Put simply, nanotechnology, more
descriptively known as molecular manufacturing, is the science and
technology of manipulating matter on an atom-by-atom basis to attain
desired configurations. While this definition appears simple, it conceals a
great deal of complexity which may impact the implementation of patent
law to the nanotechnology industry. To illustrate these complexities, it is
worth looking beneath the surface.

20. To conceptualize the nanoscale scene, consider that:
[T]he human hair is enormous in [diameter] ... [i]t is 80,000 nanometers [in
size] . . . Getting a little smaller is a human red blood cell . . . [it] is about a
thousand nanometers or one micro-meter . . . [Gloing down by a factor of
10-[you have] an adenovirus [at] ... a hundred nanometers and now the first
example... that is approaching the nanoscale. Viruses are organisms on the
nanoscale. And continuing on the one nanometer scale . . . is [the] carbon
nanotube, which is about one nanometer to two nanometers in diameter.
Newberger, supranote 3, at 651.
21. Voight & Mickelson, supranote 13, at 46.
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A. Bottom-Up Manufacturing: CreatingDevices with
Atomic Specifications
The fundamental difference between nanoscale materials and
traditional materials lies in differences in methods of manufacture. 22 Most
traditional manufacturing processes are based on top-down technologies,
i.e. taking larger objects and making them smaller. Typically, blocks of
raw material are cast, sawed, and machined into precisely formed products
by removing matter to produce smaller devices with desired
characteristics. 2' This may result in products that are large, such as ocean
liners or jumbo jets, or relatively small, such as micron-sized integrated
circuits.24 In all cases, however, matter is being processed in chunks far
larger than at the molecular scale.
But while top-down technology is familiar to most people and has
certainly proven capable of yielding products of high precision and
complexity, this method of manufacture differs from the natural processes
of the world.25 Most objects on Earth are constructed by tiny molecular
machines, such as cells and organelles, working from the bottom-up to
organize individual atoms and molecules into configurations of astonishing
complexity and diminutive size.2 6 But while this approach produces results
that would seem unattainable by traditional top-down technologies, most
bottom-up processes are taken for granted. For example, human beings are
the result of highly elaborate and parallel operations that manipulate single
cells, fertilized ovum, into configurations consisting of 75 trillion
complexly-arranged cells.2 7 As Eric Drexler 28 described in his seminal

22. Troilo, supranote 14, at 41.
23. Reynolds, supra note 4, at 181.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 182.
27. Id.
28. Eric Drexler is largely credited with the development ofnanotechnology. However, the
idea of manipulating atoms was first presented by Richard Feynman. In 1959, Feynman explored
the potential of atomic-scale manipulation in There'sPlenty ofRoom at the Bottom where he wrote:
The principles of physics, as far as I can see, do not speak against the possibility
of maneuvering things atom by atom ... It would be, in principle, possible.., for
a physicist to synthesize any chemical substance that a chemist writes down ...
How? Put the atoms down where the chemist says, and so you make the substance.
The problems of chemistry and biology can be greatly helped if our ability to see
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book Engines of Creation:
Nature shows that molecules can serve as machines because
living things work by means of such machinery. Enzymes are
molecular machines that make, break, and rearrange bonds holding
other molecules together. Muscles are driven by molecular
machines that haul fibers past one another. DNA serves as a datastorage system, transmitting digital instructions to molecular
machines, the ribosomes, that manufacture protein molecules. And
these protein molecules, in turn, make up most of the molecular
machinery just described.29
Putting these natural molecular machines to work is nothing new. Life,
which has existed for millions of years, operates by use of such machinery.
Similarly, the deliberate human programming of these machines is not
particularly new as advances in genetic engineering technology employ
such manipulation.3" What differentiates nanotechnology is an attempt to
go beyond the capabilities of natural mechanisms. Traditional chemical
manufacturing relies on the statistical movements of molecules in
solutions or in the near environment. 3' Nanotechnology, on the other hand,
permits the exact control of molecular structures that are not readily
manipulable by organic means with bacterium-sized "assembler" devices
that can be programmed. 2 In short, the basic premise is to begin with
constituent materials and build nano-devices atom-by-atom by invoking
chemical, electrical, and physical forces to manufacture a desired
configuration.33

what we are doing, and to do things on an atomic level is ultimately developed-a
development which I think cannot be avoided.
Reynolds, supra note 4, at 183-84.
29. Id. at 182.
30. Id.
31. See Wikipedia, Chemical Manufacturing, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_
manufacturing (explaining chemical manufacturing under the Technology section) (as of Dec. 6,
2007, 14:15 EST).
32. Frederick Fiedler & Glenn Reynolds, LegalProblemsofNanotechnology: An Overview,
3 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 593, 596-97 (1994).
33. Troilo, supra note 14, at 41.
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B. The Unique Effects of Quantum Mechanics
Nanotechnology is more than the mere change in size of materials; it
also involves the study and use of the unique characteristics of materials
at the nanometer scale. It is generally thought that the 100nm threshold
delineates where the physical and chemical laws of Newtonian physics
taper-off and quantum mechanics phases-in.34 In this realm, novel
functions are thought to result as "wave length of energy of a particle
begins to compete with the size of the particle, affecting its physical
properties."35
The properties of traditional materials are determined by microstructure
and composition. Experience and theory have taught us how to change
structure to improve the properties of micro- and macrosized materials.36
In contrast, the structure-property relationships for nanoscale materials can
only be found on the atomic level and, unfortunately, our inexperience
with molecular manufacturing fails to provide much guidance regarding
what to expect.37 As the size of a device decreases to the nanoscale, it is
difficult to distinguish between the device and material boundaries due to
the quantum mechanical effects of the underlying material. Almost every
property, whether optical, electrical, chemical, or magnetic, changes as
size decreases into the realm of quantum mechanics. 38 The unexpected
properties in nanosized versions of traditional materials further distinguish
nanotechnology from traditional technology.
The fundamentally distinct behavior of materials at the nanoscale level
offers intriguing possibilities. Although nanotechnology is a nascent field
surrounded by immense expectations, many first-generation products and
patents validate its promise. Examples of these patents include: the
inexpensive construction of rare molecules; 39 the production of light and
incredibly strong microfibers;4 ° the production of ultra-sensitive
detectors; 4' the use of carbon nanotubes in the construction of
34. A.J. Park, Considerationsfor PatentingNanotechnology (June 23, 2005), available at
http://www.ajpark.co.nz/library/2005/06/considerationnanotechnology.php (last visited Sept. 20,
2007).
35. Gold is an inert metal but has been shown to be a catalyst at the nanoscale level. Voight
& Mickelson, supra note 13, at 46.
36. Troilo, supranote 14, at 39.
37. Id.
38. For example, although carbon has been around for a long time, carbon nanomaterials are
excellent sources of field-emitted electrons and are used in incandescent light bulbs and lamps. Id
at 40.
39. Mark Lemley, PatentingNanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REv. 601, 602 (2005).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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semiconductors and transistors; 42 transparent sunblock for windows;
titanium dioxide in sunscreens;" stain-resistant coating for clothing or
carpeting; 45 improved drug delivery systems;' and nano-level filtration
systems that can separate pollutants or bacteria from air and water.47

C. The Perils ofParallelProcessing
As discussed earlier, the science of nanotechnology attempts to model
the design rules of Nature. In particular, nano-devices are produced by
"assemblers," numerous tiny devices operating in a parallel fashion similar
to that seen in the molecular machinery already found in living
organisms. 4' Theoretically, it is possible for a nano-device to contain
within itself "assembler" devices that can be programmed to self-replicate
in particular environments or under certain conditions. In fact, Eric Drexler
initially proposed the concept of "replicators," assembler-like devices that
could create exact copies of themselves.49
The inherent ability of technology to self-replicate is a relatively new
phenomenon, but it is not unique to nanotechnology. In Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court declared that cells, DNA, and
microorganisms are patentable if they have been genetically engineered or
modified from their natural states.5" This controversial decision affirmed
the use of biotechnology techniques that manipulate genes to permanently
modify successive generations of life by allowing the grant of patents on
such methods and derivative products. But while initially ignored, the
propensity of genetically modified genes to wander (genetic drift) and the
negative consequences of admixture were exposed by recent scientific
evidence. This issue is most contentious in the agricultural industry where
the "absence of breeding barriers" and the fungible nature of transgenic
pollen prevents the peaceful co-existence of genetically modified (GM)

42. IBM, Totally Tubular!IBMResearchers Put IntegratedCircuiton Nanotube (Mar. 24,
2006), available athttp://www.ibm.com/news/us/en/2006/03/2006_03 24.html (last visited Sept.
20, 2007).
43. Lemley, supra note 39, at 603.
44. Newberger, supra note 3, at 652.
45. Lemley, supra note 39, at 603.
46. Id.; see also Zhou, supra note 16, at 484.
47. Lemley, supra note 39, at 603.
48. Fiedler & Reynolds, supra note 32, at 599.
49. Zhou, supra note 16, at 483.
50. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,309-10 (1986); U.S. Patent No. 6,855,543 (filed
June 23, 1998).
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crops and non-GM crops."1 This caused organic farmers to revolt against
such technology because their crops cannot escape the risk of
contamination by GM gene wandering, 2 and worse, may be held liable for
infringing use of inadvertently-possessed proprietary technology.
The potential pitfalls of an equivalent application of strict liability
patent laws to nanotechnology are just as prominent and perhaps more
ascertainable. The inherent characteristics of nanotechnology, specifically
its near invisibility and potential reproducibility, create a high probability
of inadvertent infringement by unintentional possession; a concern that
was neither apparent nor considered when the patent statutes were
originally drafted. Precisely because inadvertent infringement was not
contemplated, the implementation of the strict liability standard for patent
infringement to nanotechnology is, at best, dubious. As will be discussed
below,53 the absolute application of the strict liability standard for
infringement to nanotechnology is likely to produce inequitable and
uneconomical results. The patent laws must be amended to reflect the
nuances and unique characteristics of nanotechnology. Furthermore, such
a standard is not supported by traditional doctrines regarding the purposes
of patent protection.
III. THE PATENT

BARGAIN AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
PATENT PROTECTION

Intellectual property is the foundation of the modem information
economy. In recent years, the United States has seen a dramatic rise in
gross domestic product largely attributable to exports of "knowledge
goods" in the software, life science, and computer industries.5 4 The
authority to protect intellectual property using patents derives from the
U.S. Constitution which permits Congress to award patents "to promote
the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to...

51. Jane Mathews Glenn, Footloose: Civil Responsibilityfor GMO Gene Wandering in
Canada, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 547, 547 (2004). See also Keith Aoki, Distributiveand Syncretic
Motives in Intellectual PropertyLaw, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 780-81 (2007) ("[C]ritics [are]
worried about the dangers of losing crop genetic diversity arising from widespread crop
monocultures. Meanwhile, agro-chemical corporations [prosper], trumpeting industrial agricultural
systems with the idea that 'one seed would feed the world."').
52. Glenn, supra note 51, at 548.
53. See infra Part III & IV.
54. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, IntellectualProperty: When Is It the Best Incentive
System?, at 2 (May 6, 2001), http://www.dklevine.com/archive/scotchmer-when-is-ip-best.pdf.
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Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective... Discoveries."55 This
clause grants Congress the power to create and optimize a patent system
so as to promote the social value of progress in the sciences. The current
patent system provides inventors with a powerful form of IP protection
that conveys rights to exclude others from unauthorized imitation or use
of a patented invention for a statutorily defined twenty years. A patent is
a negative property right; it grants patent owners a bundle of rights to
control their invention, including the right to exclude others from making,
using, selling, offering to sell, licensing, or importing the patented
invention in the United States during the term of the patent.5 6 As quidpro
quo, or bargain-exchange, for this time-limited grant of monopoly power,
the inventor must sufficiently disclose how to make and use the invention
in an enabling fashion so
as to facilitate the practice of the invention upon
57
the patent's expiration.
Although most inventors consider it essential, the patent system has
been under attack by many academics and policymakers since its
inception. Their predominant complaints are that intellectual property
rewards inventors beyond what is necessary to spur innovation, or that
patent protection is a drag to innovation since it prevents inventions from
being used efficiently.5" But despite criticism, the patent bargain has
endured for over 200 years because, on balance, the economic benefits
outweigh the costs of granting exclusive rights. Many of these benefits, or
virtues, are embraced within the two primary models that serve as
justifications for the patent system: the incentive-to-invent model and the
private transaction cost savings model.

55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
56. JANICE MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 14 (2003).

57. Id. at 26.
58. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 54. The problem, however, with these generalized
criticisms is that they fail to accommodate, or even consider, particular industries that heavily rely
on patent protection. Id. For example, although some highly progressive industries, notably the
computer software industry, rely on first-mover advantage rather than patents to promote invention,
other industries, including the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, depend upon patent
protection to spur invention because fixed costs for research and development are high and
marginal costs to copy are low. WILuAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 310-27 (2003). Other critics of the patent system advocate for
no patent protection. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 54. Instead, they argue, inventions
should be supported by public sponsors in the form of fixed-price contracts, prizes, or simple
reimbursements. Id. But, despite reducing the deadweight losses attributable to monopoly prices,
such forms ofinducement tend to stymie innovation by assuming that sponsoring firms have perfect
information regarding market demand for products. Id.
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A. The Incentive-to-Invest Model
The United States functions, for the most part, as a "free market
economy." Vigorous competition among firms promotes both the
opportunity for businesses and consumer freedom to choose goods and
services in an open marketplace." One consequence of a free market
economy is that, absent government intervention, we are ordinarily free to
copy the "knowledge goods such as inventions, ideas, information, and
industrial secrets, of others without fear of liability. ' 60 These intangible
products inherently differ from tangible objects and real property and are,
by nature, inexhaustible and non-excludeable. 6' The critical problem with
generating "knowledge goods" stems from the disproportionate costs of
development by inventors relative to appropriation by competitors.
Inventions, which often cannot be developed without considerable upfront
investment, may be copied at marginal or trivial cost.62 To see why this is
so, consider a pharmaceutical compound that cures a life threatening
illness. This invention is a combination of tangible embodiments and
intangible ideas. However, while both the information and the tangible
components are costly to the inventor, only the tangible components are
costly to a rival.63 Many millions of dollars may have been invested by
brand-name firms to create the pharmaceutical compound, but once its
chemical structure is known generic drug manufacturers can copy it for
pennies.' Therefore, without some sort of protection, the inventor will be
at a market disadvantage relative to his rivals, and may be dissuaded from
investing. Absent a mechanism to exclude "free riders," people who enjoy
the benefit of a good without paying for it, public goods will be underproduced, leading to a market failure known as the "public goods
problem."65
Fortunately, collective action problems can be solved by government
actions that modify individual incentives to engage in desirable behavior.
The patent law provides an example of this sort of market intervention.
Variations to different parameters of the Patent Act, such as scope, term,
and patentable subject matter, allow Congress to manipulate behavior to

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

ROGER SCHECHTER & JOHN THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW

Id.
supranote 56, at 6.
Id.
See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 54.
MUELLER, supra note 56, at 6.
Id. at 7.
MUELLER,

9 (2004).
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spur or slow economic growth and social welfare.66 The principle rationale
of patent law is that time-limited exclusivity provides an efficient method
of enabling the benefits of research and development to be internalized,
thereby promoting innovation and technical progress.67 Patents restructure
the risk of market failure by allowing inventors to gain a period of
exclusivity in the market with which to recover or recoup the investment
and cost of their invention. 6' The Patent Act is also thought to simulate
technological advancement by inducing others to "invent around"
proprietary technology. Therefore, the inventor's disclosure, a condition
of the patent grant, provides opportunities to benefit society by direct
utility to the users or consumers of embodiments of the invention, and
through the use of the inventive idea as a springboard to further
innovation.69

66. Many patent scholars invested considerable effort in analyzing derivations of the patent
bargain to determine how characteristics of the patent grant, such as scope and term, may optimize
social benefit, i.e., maximized aggregate inventive progress. Nordhaus provided perhaps the most
influential work on patent design. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supranote 54. Nordhaus explained that
patents should have finite length to balance the need to encourage innovation and the desire to
avoid deadweight loss that occurs through monopoly pricing. Id. Nordhaus reasoned that the goals
of patent law are not mutually exclusive and must be appropriately balanced. If the sole concern
was promoting innovation, a policy that provides infinite patent protection would best serve this
purpose. On the other hand, if the primary concern is to avoid deadweight loss, patent protection
should not exist at all. Id. Nordhaus postulated that longer protection encourages greater inventive
progress, but only by prolonging societal cost in the form of deadweight loss. This simple
framework spawned follow-up research on the effect of the design question of patent breadth or
scope, most notably by Gallini and Scotchmer. Gallini proposed a model where patent breadth,
defined technologically as the cost that rivals must incur to "design around" or imitate without
infringement, determines the ease of entry into a protected market. Id. For a given imitation cost,
sufficiently long and narrow patents attract rivals that copy the patent resulting in oligopoly pricing
rather than monopoly pricing. Id. Thus, long and narrow patents encourage imitation rather than
innovation, a social cost that has two components: deadweight loss and the cost of imitation. Gallini
shows that the optimal patent law design minimizes these costs by proving broad and short patent
protection. The patent should be just long enough for the monopolist patent holder to recoup
investment cost, and broad enough to prevent wasteful imitation. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra
note 54. Scotchmer furthered Gallini's fundamental concept by applying her theories to the
complexities of real markets where innovations are cumulative and build upon each other.
Scotchmer argued that statutory life may be irrelevant in a cumulative market since noninfringing
improvements can displace protected products. Id. Therefore, patent policy should provide broad
patent protection, i.e., by strong novelty requirements, which increase a patent's effective life (the
time before the appearance of the substitute good). Id.
67. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 58, at 294.
68. Katherine Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent
Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 81, 90 (2004).
69. Id. at 91.
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B. The Private TransactionCost Savings Model
Recent empirical data suggests that the incentive model for patent law
is, at best, a partial justification for the patent system. Studies by the
Brooking Institute suggest that "the empirical literature is inconclusive on
...whether stronger patents increase or decrease innovation., 7' Nonincentive models to justify patent grants, such as signaling information to
markets regarding the R&D capacity and human capital strength71 and
enabling trading in informational assets to stimulate a thicker technology
market,72 have suggested alternative ways of thinking about the patent
system. This discussion will focus on the most compelling non-incentive
based theory, the private transaction cost savings.
The private transaction cost savings justification suggests that the
patent system is a response to the economic problems inherent in trade
secrecy and market structure. In general, firms that develop information
assets must choose between two predominant forms of protection: patent
protection or trade secrecy. If a firm chooses to exploit information
secretly, it must take physical precautions and bind "employees, managers,
licensees, potential licensees, sources of venture capital, and other
information transferees through a complex web of contracts."73 Although
firms can rationally choose to reduce the possibility of misappropriation
by extracting promises of confidentiality through contract rights or fencing
the secret off from team members, the time and effort necessary to
administer, monitor, and enforce confidentiality in a large team context is
substantial.74 Should the cost of these transactions lend a firm to consider
assignment, the transferor firm is likely to encounter asset partition
difficulties since title to a trade secret cannot be recorded.75 Therefore, a
transferee firm bears the risk that the transferor firm acquired the title in
good faith, and will not unilaterally reduce its value by revealing it to
others. Again, though contracts can be written to deter opportunistic
behavior by the transferor of a trade secret, entering into and policing such
protective agreements raises the cost of the transaction.76

70. Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law 66 OwO ST. L.J. 473, 474
(2005).
71. See Clarisa Long, PatentSignals, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 626-27 (2002).
72. Robert Merges, Intellectual PropertyRights and the New InstitutionalEconomics, 53
VAND. L. REv. 1857, 1877 (2000).
73. See Heald, supranote 70, at 476.
74. See id. at 488.
75. See id. at 481-82.
76. See id. at 482.
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The patent form can thus be characterized as a legal structure designed
to reduce costs associated with these alternative regimes. By establishing
a title registration system under 35 U.S.C. § 261 for some sorts of
information assets, patent ownership rules significantly reduce transaction
costs compared to trade secrecy and contract law.77 In the assignment
context, title registration effectively establishes a liability regime to
enforce proprietary rights without the need to expend costs though
protective agreements or to identify the quality of legal rights transferred.78
Similarly, an enterprise's ability to record its ownership of an information
asset reduces the costs of erecting fences to deter misappropriation and of
deterring opportunistic rent seeking by team members.79
C. InadvertentInfringement Does Not Furtherthe Goals of
PatentProtection
Any determination that liability for inadvertent infringement comports
with the purposes of patent protection is, at best, questionable. The
incentive-to-invest model suggests that a time-limited right to make, use,
and sell an invention provides an incentive to potential patentees to invest
in research and development, and to disclose their inventions. It provides
the patentee with the ability to determine who may capture the benefits of
his invention.8" This right is enforced through infringement actions, which
allow a patentee to prevent against the intentional "free riding" of its
technology and the unjust enrichment of another. Generally, an infringer
is liable for the benefit acquired by the unlawful use of the patentee's
technology. For example, A is liable for infringement and required to
repay B if he acquired a $500,000 benefit for making and selling B's
technology. Even in instances where the Patent Act finds infringement but
prevents damage awards to the patentee,81 the infringer must still derive
some benefit from the unauthorized trespass on the patentee's right.
But the context on inadvertent infringement is different. It is not a zerosum game because individuals that unintentionally acquire proprietary
technology can be held liable for infringement, and required to pay
damages even if they derive no benefit from its use. In other words, an
infringer may be forced to pay damages for the expected benefit they
acquired based on use of a patented technology, whether or not they
77. See id. at 476.
78. See Heald, supranote 70, at 482.
79. See id. at 488.
80. Preston, supranote 19, at 1168.
81. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (the medical use exception permits the medical use of
proprietary technology free from liability for patent infringement).
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actually incurred that benefit. The absurdity of this conclusion is more
explicit in situations where inadvertent use of a patented technology results
in harm to the infringer. Under the current patent law, A may be liable for
infringement despite incurring $500,000 in damages caused by the
inadvertent use of B's technology. The incentive-based justification was
meant to protect a patentee's investment; it should not be abused to permit
the patentee windfall by immunizing him from tort liability for the longterm consequences of a technology's introduction.12 The goal of increasing
inventive activity is not furthered by making an innocent possessor who
derives no benefit from the technology, and may in fact suffer harm, liable
for infringement.
Similarly, liability for inadvertent infringement fails the private
transaction cost savings justification for patent protection. This model
provides patentees with a means to "propertize" ideas so they can be used
in later transactions. However, inadvertent users have no opportunity to
transact or bargain for use of proprietary technology ahead of time because
they have no knowledge of its possession. Patent enforcement, therefore,
would serve as a means for patentees to extract "rents" from individuals
that never intended to use the patented technology. Ironically, enforcing
liability against innocent infringers would only encourage the rent-seeking
behavior83that the private transaction cost savings model had hoped to
prevent.
IV. THE STRICT LIABILITY REGIME
A. The HistoricalDevelopment of Strict Liability
The origin of strict liability can be traced to Fletcher v. Rylands, a
1860s case where an English court, in one of the most significant and
controversial precedents in the strict liability canon, held that proof of
negligence was not 84required for "non-natural" or potentially
"mischievous" activities. In this case, Rylands, an extremely successful
entrepreneur, hired a contractor to build an underground reservoir to power

82. Patricia Farnese, Patently Unreasonable:Reconsideringthe ResponsibilityofPatentees
in Today's Inventive Climate, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2004).
83. See Heald, supra note 70, at 489.
84. Jed Shugerman, The FloodgatesofStrict Liability:BurstingReservoirs and the Adoption
of Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333, 333-34 (2000).
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his steam-powered textile mill. Fletcher, a neighboring coal miner, brought
suit when the reservoir burst flooding his interconnecting maze of mines.85
Writing for a unaminous court, Justice Blackburn announced a broad
statement of liability:
[T]he person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,
must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of
its escape. 6
Prior to this decision, the negligence standard was the predominant
doctrine of the American landscape.
In fact, early scholars repudiated the strict liability doctrine, choosing
instead to adhere to the fault doctrine.87 But despite its early rejection,
notably, the result of American courts initially subsidizing the industrial
revolution and not wanting to hinder industrial development by imposing
tough liability standards, a series of terrifying experiences with the
revolution's darker side, including reservoir failures, mining deaths, and
railway accidents, made the industrial age's risks more salient and
triggered the wide imposition of strict liability.88 These dramatic events,
combined with the broad social changes of the late nineteenth century,
tapped into an inchoate notion that the cheapest cost avoider ought to bear
liability.89 Although early courts never used the phrase "cheapest cost
avoider, ' 90 some decisions emphasized that the producers or owners have
control over hazardous activity.91 Therefore, although early courts may not
have formulated an economic model or articulated the theory explicitly,
they did have a basic intuition that those who create ultrahazardous risks
and have the ability to reduce them should bear responsibility for any
resulting damage. 92

85. Id.at 333.
86. Id. at 338.
87. Id.at 340.
88. Id. at 373.
89. Shugerman, supranote 84, at 373.
90. See infra Part IV.C.2.
91. Shugerman, supra note 84, at 374 ("In Robb v. CarnegieBros.... the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court... emphasized that the producer controls the risks: '[The producer] may increase
his business at will, or diminish it. He may transfer it to another person, or place, or state, or
abandon it."').
92. Id.
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B. The Implementation of Strict Liability in PatentLaw: The
Notice Distinction
Section 271 (a) of the Patent Act provides that "whosoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within
the United States ...during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the

patent." 93 In Hilton Davis Chemical v. Warner Jenkinson, the Court
clarified that "intent is not an element of direct infringement, whether
literal or by equivalents. Neither Graver Tank nor any other authority
supports the proposition that preventing 'fraud on a patent' ... turns on the

subjective awareness or intent of the accused infringer."'9 4 The mindset of
an alleged infringer is not an element of infringement, and courts have
consistently held that intent is irrelevant to the outcome of an infringement
inquiry. However, once infringement has been determined, "intent"
becomes relevant because damages are awarded based on the infringer's
culpability. Section 284 requires the court to award "damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement."95 If holders of a patent claim willful
infringement, evaluating "intent to infringe" is necessary to determine
appropriate damages. 96 The patent statute, therefore, determines
infringement under a strict liability standard.
But patent law is not strict liability in its purest sense, or at least not in
the sense in which it is used in tort law. Strict liability is traditionally
defined as liability without fault.97 In the tort context, damages, whether
monetary or in the form of an injunction, flow from a determination that
a right of the plaintiff has been breached. Patent infringement is a strict
liability tort in the sense that a defendant may be liable if he "makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention." But in contrast to the
common tort law situation, the defendant in a patent infringement suit is
sometimes not liable for damages until the plaintiff puts them on notice.98
In other words, the patent law may provide a right without a remedy since
a defendant may only be liable for damages arising subsequent to a notice
of infringement. This provision is codified in § 287(a) which states:

93. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
94. Hilton Davis Chemical v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (1995).
95. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
96. In Jurgens v. CBK, holders of a patent for windsock duck decoys sued asserting willful
infringement. The Court found that CBK acted with the requisite culpability and in bad faith when
it sold its own decoys with knowledge of Jurgens' patent rights and acted with disregard of those
rights. See Jurgens v. CBK, 80 F.3d 1566, 1573 (1996).
97. Roger Blair & Thomas Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 800 (2002).
98. Id.at801.
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Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within
the United States any patented article for or under them, or
importing any patented article into the United States, may give
notice to the public that the same is patented, either by fixing
thereon the word "patent" or the abbreviation "pat.", together with
the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the article,
this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one
or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice. In the
event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the
patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the
infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe
thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for
infringement occurring after such notice. Filing an action for
infringement shall constitute such notice. 99
Therefore, although patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the
Patent Act makes the recovery of damages contingent upon the
defendant's intentional decision to continue infringing after having
received notice.' 0 In fact, the Federal Circuit suggested as much, stating
that § 287(a) "serves three related purposes: (1) helping to avoid innocent
infringement; (2) encouraging patentees to give notice to the public that
the article is patented; and (3) aiding the public to identify whether an
article is patented."' '° However, the notice requirement has two important
limitations. First, the statute does not apply unless the patentee or his
licensee manufactures products covered by the patent.0 2 As a result, the
owner of an infringed process patent can extract damages from the
beginning of the infringement, regardless of whether the defendant is on
notice or has knowledge of the patent."' And second, if the patent holder

99. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
100. Blair & Cotter, supra note 97, at 802-04.
101. Id. at 804 (citing Nike v. Wal-Mart Stores, 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed Cir. 1998)).
102. Id. at 834-35.
103. Id.at 835 (citing Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246
F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
The rationale for not requiring marking in the case of process patents is that
processes cannot be marked... Patent law nevertheless could restrict the process
patent owner from recovering damages attributable to "innocent"
infringement-or else provide for some other form of constructive notice of a
process patent-but presently it does not.
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relies on the providing "actual notice"'" rather than patent marking, there
are no steadfast requirements for the content of this notice.'° 5 As a result,
the notice requirement is often perfunctory and satisfied by supplying
varying, and often minimal, degrees of content regarding the patent alleged
to be infringed.
In general, courts are not sympathetic to infringers that intended to
engage in a non-infringing design-around. In these situations, an individual
that purposefully engages in design-around is generally deemed to have
been on constructive notice of infringement." 6 However, courts have not
had much occasion to consider cases involving inadvertent infringement
by unintentional possession. Applying a presumption of constructive
notice is excessive in these situations because individuals that passively
possess proprietary technology may have no knowledge of its acquisition.
In the few cases that were considered, the court strained to apply principles
of equity to the hard and fast rule of strict liability.
1. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.
The most recent case discussing liability for inadvertent infringement
of a patented process claim is SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.
In this case, SmithKline Beecham (SKB) brought suit alleging that Apotex
infringed on its patent relating to an antidepressant, crystalline paroxetine
hydrochloride hemihydrate (PHC hemihydrate), its preparation, and its use
as a therapeutic agent. 1 7 The facts indicate that SKB discovered, and
subsequently patented, this compound while trying to improve upon a
PHC anhydrate patent it licensed from a British company, Ferrosan, five
years prior.' 8 SKB found that the PHC hemihydrate formulation was more
stable and easy to preserve than its anhydrous form. Independently of
SKB's discovery, Apotex filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) with the FDA seeking approval to produce a generic form of an
antidepressant containing PHC anhydrate. °9 On the basis of this filing,
SK.B initiated suit alleging that Apotex was infringing on their patent by
manufacturing PHC anhydrate tablets that "necessarily contain, by a
conversion process . . . at least trace amounts of PHC hemihydrate"

104.
105.
(2005).
106.
(defining
107.
108.
109.

See infra Part V.A.2.
David Catechi, Two Wrongs Don't Make a PatentRight, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 789-90
See Wikipedia, Constructive Notice, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivenotice
Constructive Notice) (as of Dec. 6, 2007, 14:30 EST).
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1334 (2005).
Id.
Id.
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through a seeding process that converts PHC anhydrous into its more
stable hemihydrate form."' In an opinion by Judge Posner, the district
court held the claim valid and not infringed after reading a limitation into
Claim 1 that required PHC hemihydrate to be created in "commercially
significant amounts." In the alternative, should Claim 1 be construed to
cover any amount of PHC hemihydrate, the Apotex court proffered that
SKB caused the alleged infringement by "conduct that rendered the
practice of the prior art impossible without infringing [its PHC
hemihydrate patent]."' " In effect, the district court created a new equitable
defense to infringement to absolve Apotex of liability.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concurred in the result but criticized
Posner's reasoning. The Apotex court held that the PHC hemihydrate
patent was invalid because it was inherently anticipated by the PHC
anhydrous patent (the patent SKB initially licensed), even though it does
not discuss PHC hemihydrate." 2 The Federal Circuit based its decision
largely on an inability to reconcile the inconsistent positions asserted by
SKB. On the one hand, SKB asserted that the creation of PHC anhydrous
creation will inevitably result in a product containing their patented
compound. On the other hand, SKB contended that creation of PHC
anhydrate before their discovery does not have the same result." 3 The
Federal Circuit accordingly found the patent invalid as anticipated. Based
on this conclusion, the potential merit of the district court's proposed
equitable defense was rendered moot and the Federal Circuit chose not to
address the equitable defense theory proposed by the district court." 4
Interestingly, however, the Federal Circuit stated, in dicta, that
Apotex's product would have infringed SKB's PHC hemihydrous patent
if the patent was deemed valid.' The circuit court did not address the
notice requirement, but implied that active, though inadvertent, creation
of a patented product is infringement.'' 6
2. Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada,Inc.
Perhaps the most relevant case involving inadvertent infringement is
the Canadian case Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada,Inc. While courts in the
United States are not bound by decisions in other jurisdictions, the
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.at 1334-35.
Id.at 1336.
Apotex,403 F.3d at 1343.
Id.at 1341.
Id.at 1342-46.
Id.at 1341.
See generally id.
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decision by the Canadian Supreme Court may prove persuasive should a
U.S. court be faced with a case involving infringement by inadvertent and
passive possession.
In the 1990s, many farmers, including five in Schmeiser's area,
switched to Roundup Ready canola. This canola variety, developed by
Monsanto, contains genetically modified genes and cells that make the
canola resistant to herbicides containing glyphosate, a chemical that kills
plants. 1 7 Farmers license Monsanto's canola because it allows them to
control the spread of weeds by spraying their crop with Roundup while
avoiding seeding delays. In this case, Monsanto brought an infringement
action against Schmeiser, an organic farmer surrounded by five farms that
license GM canola, for the unauthorized use of their patented canola
product. Schmeiser claimed that he neither knowingly acquired the
technology nor sprayed his seeds with Roundup." 8 Rather, he claimed to
use a longstanding farming practice of saving his own canola seed for
replanting the following year." 9 In the appellate court opinion, Judge
Sharlow wrote: "In my view, it is an open question whether Monsanto
could, in such circumstances [of inadvertent presence], obtain a remedy for
infringement on the basis that the intention of the alleged infringer is
irrelevant. However, that question does not need to be resolved in this
case." 2° Instead, the appellate court held that Schmeiser, regardless of the
means of acquisition, either knew or should have known that the subject
seeds saved from the previous year were glyphosate resistant and he
infringed when he intentionally planted and harvested contaminated seed
saved from the previous year.' 2 ' Schmeiser was fined $15,450 in license
fees, $105,000 for the22 value of the crop, and $25,000 for punitive and
exemplary damages.
On appeal, the Canadian Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that
the mere possession of a patented invention creates a rebuttable
presumption of "use," and that Schmeiser failed to rebut this presumption
by proving that he did not intend to infringe. 123 The general rule is that a
defendant's intention is irrelevant in the infringement inquiry.

117. Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 S.C.C. 34 (Can.).
118. Roger McEowen, Legallssues Related to the Use andOwnershipof GeneticallyModified
Organisms, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 611, 645 (2004).
119. Id. at 645-46.
120. Drew Kershen, Of Straying Crops and Patent Rights, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 575, 601
(2004).
121. Id. at 601.
122. McEowen, supra note 118, at 646.
123. Id. at 647.
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However, the Canadian Court differs from American courts in that
intention becomes relevant where the defense invoked is "possession
without use.' 24 The Canadian Court distinguishes patent infringement
cases that turn on "use" from ordinary infringement cases that turn on
comparing a thing made or sold by a defendant with the construed claims26
of a plaintiffs patent. 121 Citing a nineteenth century case Adair v. Young, 1
the Schmeiser court stated that: "[w]here the alleged use consists of
exploitation of the invention's 'stand-by' utility [glyphosate resistance]...
it is relevant whether the defendant intended to exploit the invention
should the need arise.' 2 7
The Court reasoned that Schmeiser failed to provide sufficient evidence
to rebut the presumption of "use" of Monsanto's patent.12 In fact, the case
turned on evidence suggesting that Schmeiser purposefully planted the
subject seeds despite the fact that Monsanto had provided Schmeiser
notice of suspected infringement.1 29 On the issues of damages, however,
the Court held that the Patent Act only entitles the patentee to the portion
of the infringer's profit causally attributable to the patented invention. 3
Because Schmeiser earned
no profit from infringing, Monsanto was not
131
damages.
any
to
entitled
In essence, the Court stated that the process by which a defendant
acquired the patented seed, whether active or passive, is irrelevant to this
case. The Court's reasoning places upon crop farmers an affirmative duty

124. Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 S.C.C. 34 (Can.).
125. Id.
126. Id. The court cited Adair v. Young where possession was found to constitute infringing
use.
[A] ship's master was sued for infringement in relation to the presence of patented
pumps on his ship. The ship's owners had fitted the ship with the pumps... [and]
[t]he master had no power to remove the pumps and had never used them to pump
water in British waters. However, the court held that the master intended to use the
pumps if the need arose.
Adair v. Young, 12 Ch. D. 13 (C.A. 1879).
127. Schmeiser, 2004 S.C.C. at 34, 40.
128. McEowen, supra note 118, at 646.
129. Schmeiser, 2004 S.C.C. at 34, 46.
130. McEowen, supra note 118, at 647.
131. Id. This is similar to the medical use exception in the Patent Act, which covers all
medical practitioners and permits the medical use of proprietary technology. In this situation, the
patent holder of said technology has a right without a remedy. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c); see also Gerald
J. Mossinghoff, Remedies Under Patents on Medical and Surgical Procedures,78 J. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 789-801 (1996).
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to ensure that unwanted and patented genetic traits do not enter and
contaminate their crop.132 This appears to present farmers that do not use
GMOs with a legal duty with which it is nearly impossible to comply,
short of adopting the technology for their own crops and paying the
licensing fees. The only way for an organic farmer to test for contaminated
seed would be to spray his crops with Roundup; a Catch-22 situation since
the test to avoid infringement may ultimately kill his entire non-GMO
crop. 133
In both Apotex and Schmeiser, the court appears to place the duty to
avoid infringement solely on the alleged infringers. Even where patented
technology may be unintentionally and passively acquired, the court
refuses to discuss a patent holder's possible culpability. Putting equitable
considerations aside, we must question whether this conclusion fulfills the
goal of strict liability-economic efficiency.
C. The Economic Rationalefor Strict Liability
From an economic perspective, it is equally unfortunate to bear the
material cost and inconvenience of avoiding accidents as it is to bear the
costs (in human and property terms) of having accidents. Since the costs
of having and the costs of avoiding accidents are equally undesirable, the
traditional goal of efficiency analysis is to minimize the sum of these costs
(the total social cost). If we assume that the ultimate objective of law is to
reduce to a minimum the societal costs while maximizing wealth, the
costs is a fatal flaw and waste of society's scarce
failure to minimize
34
resources. 1
The legal literature regarding economic theories of strict liability is
dominated by two scholars: Richard Posner's Positive Economic Theory,
which emphasizes social wealth maximization; and Guido Calabresi's
Cheapest Cost-Avoider, which focuses mostly on reducing the social costs
132. Preston, supranote 19, at 1159.
[A]s a general rule, the law imposes no duty on one person actively to assist in the
preservation of the... property of another... even though the means by which
the harm can be averted are in his hands. Under the Schmeiser analysis, the court
is attempting to do just that-to backdoor a duty on the farmer to keep his
property clear of GMO invasions in order to protect the patentee's property
interest in the patent.
Id. at 1171.
133. Id. at 1159.
134. David Barnes & Rosemary McCool, Reasonable Care in Tort Law: The Duty to take
CorrectivePrecautions,36 ARiz. L. REv. 357, 364 (1994).
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of accidents. Although these theories appear to espouse two sides of the
same coin, in certain situations their application may lead to wholly
different outcomes.
1. The Positive Economic Theory
Posner began his Economic Analysis of Law with the assumption that
''man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life," that "people respond to
incentives," such as economic rewards, prices, and criminal penalties, and
that resources tend to gravitate toward their highest valued uses if
exchange is permitted.'35 More generally, Posner is a dispositionist; he
assumes that behavior is the result of stable preferences and willful choices
by rational agents. 136 Posner presumes that individuals are competently
able to process available information and make judgments, in the absence
of systemic bias, such that resources naturally gravitate toward their
highest-valued use.'37
Although Posner admits that people may exhibit irrational behavior
quirks, i.e., risk aversion, his analysis of the economics of tort law assumes
that the utility functions of both injurers and victims are risk neutral. In his
model, accidents occur between two risk-neutral, rational, and wealthmaximizing parties: a victim (the party that suffers harm) and the injurer
(the other party). Posner simplifies wealth maximization by assessing
social welfare (in terms of social cost) as the sum of all utilities or incomes
of both parties, independent of influence from other societal players.I 8 For
example, assume an accident between two people, A and B, where A is the
injured (plaintiff) and B is the injurer (defendant). Under Posner's
economic calculus, social cost can
be expressed as a function of the
3 9
parties' levels of care as follows:1
Let:

L(x,y) = p(x,y)D + A(x) + B(y)
L = social cost
x = injured's (A) level of care
y = injurer's (B) level of care
p(x,y) = probability of an accident between A and B, 0 < p
<1

135. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1 (1972).
136. Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Costs of Dispositionism:The PrematureDemise
of SituationistLaw and Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 24, 37 (2005).
137. Id.

138. WILIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 59
(1987).

139. Id.
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A(x) = cost of care to A
B(y) = cost of care to B
D = dollar equivalent of the injury to A
The socially optimal "due care" levels, x* and y*, which minimize L(x, y),
can then be found by taking the first partial derivatives of L with respect
to x any y and setting the resulting expressions equal to zero (See Figures
A and B, below). 4 ' This requires that x* and y* satisfy the following
conditions: 4 '
Ax = -pxD
By = -pyD

Let:

Ax = injured's (A) marginal cost of care
By = injurer's (B) marginal cost of care

Under this analysis, each party should keep adding inputs of care (x, y)
until the reduction in expected damages (-pxD, -pyD) is equal to the
marginal cost of the last unit of care (A, BY). Before this point is reached
(x*, y*), an additional input of care would confer a greater social benefit
in reducing the injured party's expected damages than it would cost on
additional expenditures on care. Beyond this point, an additional input of
care would cost more than it was worth in damage avoidance. 142 Under
"joint care" situations, both x* and y* are positive,
meaning that it would
143
be optimal for both A and B to take some care.
p(x)D

p(y)D

Ax

By

-pxD
x.

X

y

y

Figure A: Illustrates the socially optimal due care levels (x*, y*) of the injured (A) and injurer (B), respectively, in "joint care" situations
where both parties are required to invest in accident avoidance. These due care levels are calculated by taking the first partial
derivative of the social cost function.

140. Id. at 60.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. LANDES &POSNER, supranote 138, at 60.
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However, under a strict liability regime without a defense of
contributory negligence, the potential injured (A) has no incentive to take
care because he will be fully compensated for his injury. But the injurer
(B) has an incentive to invest in care up to the point where -pyD = By,
given x = 0, because D is a cost to B if an accident occurs. 1" Applying the
rule of strict liability to the patent infringement context, the social cost can
be quantified by the following formula:145
L(y)
Let:

p(y)D + B(y)
L = social cost
y = the units of care, search of patent database
p(y) = probability of patent infringement
B(y) = cost of search to potential infringer
D = dollar equivalent of infringement damages

At the cost minimizing search level (y*), the total cost (L*), which equals
the sum of the search cost, B(y*), and the expected infringement damages,
p(y*)D. 4 6 Because p(y*)D remains positive, the optimal units of care
(search) does not reduce the probability of infringement to zero. 47
' In other
words, there remains a socially optimal amount of infringement since
reducing the probability of infringing such that p(y)D is lower than p(y*)D
is not cost justified.
To summarize, strict liability is efficient in two situations: (1) where
only the injurer may take precaution to reduce the probability of an
accident, and (2) where there is no reasonable (cost-justified) measure of
care that a potential injured can take to reduce the probability of an
accident.' 48 Unfortunately, a rule of strict liability for patent infringement
allows no accommodation for unintentional infringement. The rule
governs irrespective of costs expended or measures utilized by the
infringer to prevent infringement. In principle, an infringer is liable for the
economic injuries that the infringement caused and the patentee will
receive full compensation. 4 9
In the context of patent law, unintentional infringement primarily
occurs due to imperfect knowledge of existing patents. Presumably,
unintentional infringement can be avoided if perfect information is

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 63.
Blair & Cotter, supranote 97, at 822.
Id. at 824.
Id.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 138, at 63.
Blair & Cotter, supranote 97, at 821.
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acquired by careful searches of PTO records. However, acquiring perfect
information requires complete search efforts that come at a considerable
cost. It remains debatable whether an alternative negligence standard,
which requires reasonable search efforts, would provide a more optimal
economic solution by lowering total societal costs. Posner's theory is
further limited because he assumes that the injurer affirmatively and
purposefully engaged in infringing activity; his analysis does not entertain
the possibility that technology may be acquired unintentionally. In such
situations, a standard that requires consumers to constantly police against
inadvertent possession would most certainly increase total societal costs.
2. The Cheapest Cost-Avoider
Calabresi's understanding of human action is significantly more
situational than Posner's. Unlike Posner, Calabresi has long doubted that
humans are rational agents capable of making reliable judgments. To the
contrary, he believes that "we humans do not understand ourselves well.
We tend to attribute causation, responsibility, and even blame to
individuals, and to disregard the often more powerful role played by
processes, systems, and situations." 5 ' Calabresi contends that
unappreciated constraints, including personal cognitive constraints and
exterior environmental constraints, 5' frame behavior which can hardly be
said to result from free choice.' 52
Based on these underlying assumptions of human behavior, Calabresi
proposed that the cheapest cost-avoider should constitute the basic test for
a general system of strict liability. In its general form, the cheapest costavoider is the person who could avoid the accident at lowest cost.'5 3 In
situations where one person is the cheapest cost avoider for a particular
accident, a rule that assigns liability to the cheapest cost-avoider is
efficient.'54 If the injurer is the cheapest cost-avoider, the injurer is held
strictly liable. Likewise, if the injured is the cheapest cost-avoider, the
injured is strictly liable and bears the loss. Therefore, this rule operates
under the assumption that the cheapest cost-avoider will take reasonable
care to avoid the accident.
150. Benforado & Hanson, supra note 136, at 42.
151. The most striking demonstrations of the power of the camouflaged situation are Stanley
Milgrim's series of experiments where ordinary people were induced to administer massive shocks
to human subjects. Id. at 44.
152. Id. at42.
153. Steven Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L.
REv. 1291, 1306 (1992).
154. Id.
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However, it has been argued that Calabresi structured the cheapest
cost-avoider test in a peculiar way. Calabresi defined the cheapest costavoider as the person best suited to (1) carry out a cost-benefit analysis of
the accident risk, and then (2) act on that analysis.' In doing so, he sought
to distance this test from the negligence test such that the court would
primarily concern itself with determining the relative abilities of parties to
carry out the cost-benefit analysis rather than consider the specific
precautions implemented.' 56 Calabresi argued that the resulting test is
easier to apply "because it looks to questions such as which party is better
informed as to the risks and alternatives instead of to questions requiring
the weighing of accident costs and avoidance costs, both of which must be
'
subjectively determined by the trier of fact."157
While this may be true,
Calabresi's test may fail in situations where determining the
reasonableness of precautionary measures, by both the injurer and injured,
is worthy of consideration.
Still, as an empirical matter, it seems clear that the cheapest costavoider test is applicable to a larger fraction of accidents than Posner's
unilateral-care analysis which demands that the injurer bear the entire cost
of avoiding infringement. In certain situations, particularly where
patentees' actions contribute to the infringing activity, this test may realize
a more equitable result.
D. The Problem with Applying Strict Liability to Nanotechnology
Ordinarily, extraneous issues such as culpability or "intent" are avoided
when courts apply a strict liability standard. Positive economic theory
demands that the potential tortfeasor, the infringer, invest in precautions
to avoid liability without contribution from the other party, the patentee.
Although it may seem unfair to impose such a unilateral care standard,
there are three reasons, interalia,why strict liability offers an efficient and
cost-effective solution for assessing liability in patent law. First, traditional
technology is generally clearly visible or easily detectable by quantifiable
techniques. This allows an individual to either visually inspect a
technology for patent markings, or invest in care by searching patent
databases to determine whether a technology is patented. Second, most
patent infringement suits involve an alleged infringer that intended to
engage in a non-infringing "design around." An alleged infringer can thus
be said to possess constructive notice of infringement because he is aware

155. Id.
156. Id. at 1306-07.
157. Id. at 1307.
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of the potential for infringement. And third, the activity that elicits
infringement is under the exclusive control of the infringer. No defense of
contributory infringement can be asserted against the patentee because he
cannot control whether an individual engages in unlawful activity.
The Federal Circuit's decision in Apotex clearly validates these criteria.
First, Apotex determined that it had inadvertently possessed PHC
hemihydrate by using known quantifying techniques. Second, although
Apotex did not intend to infringe, it actively engaged in producing a
generic PHC anhydrous compound. And third, the infringing conduct was
under the exclusive control of Apotex. Without influence from SKB,
Apotex chose to engage in a course of action that ultimately led to the
inadvertent possession of a patented product. A presumption of
infringement is confirmed by the court's statement, in dicta, that Apotex
would have been found to infringe under the strict liability standard if
SKB's patent been found valid.'58 The latter two criteria distinguish Apotex
from the situation in Schmeiser where the defendant could have argued
that he inadvertently and passively acquired the patented canola because
of Monsanto's negligent control over its technology.
The nanotechnology and self-replicating GMO contexts, however, are
markedly different. In these contexts, the equitable and economical
reasons for applying strict liability may be absent since infringement may
occur based on inadvertent use of passively-possessed technology. For
example, the plaintiffs in Schmeiser did not allege that the defendant
produced or sold a genetically altered seed with similar Roundup-resistant
characteristics, but simply that he improperly used patented technology.
Although this case was easily decided based on evidence suggesting that
the defendant knew that he was using Monsanto's patented seed, it is
worth considering how the Court might have ruled if the defendant was
proven to be without knowledge that he inadvertently and passively
acquired the patented canola, that is if uncontrollable pollen flow from GM
plants on neighboring farms resulted in cross-pollinated seed on
defendant's farm. This hypothetical situation is analogous to inadvertent
infringement actions likely to arise with nanotechnology given its
diminutive nature. These non-traditional situations can be distinguished
from the Apotex context because defendants passively possess potentially
hazardous technology through conduct that may arguably be the result of
a patent holder's negligence.
The current strict liability for patent infringement fails in this regard.
The notice requirement, which was intended to prevent inadvertent
158. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d at 1331, 1341 (2005).
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infringement, is ineffective because a lack of strictly defined requirements
has led to its inconsistent, and often lenient, application. Under nontraditional circumstances where a patent holder may contribute to the
infringing conduct by negligent control of patented technology, such as by
failing to inhibit the spread or reproduction of technology, a more vigorous
notice requirement may avert the inequitable and uneconomical misuse of
strict liability. Patent holders should be required to provide potential
infringers with prior notice and an opportunity to cease use before
infringement is found, even in contexts where damages may not be
awarded.
V. STRENGTHENING THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT: AN EQUITABLE
SOLUTION THAT FURTHERS THE PURPOSE OF THE PATENT LAW

The problem with the current state of the law is an imbalance of the
property rights between patent holders of self-replicating technology or
organisms, and consumers that bear a substantial risk of being harmed by
the inadvertent use or contamination of such technology.159 This imbalance
results from the strict liability nature of patent infringement combined with
the unique nature of current technology, particularly the problems with its
identification and the potential inability to control its reproducibility. As
hypothesized earlier with an analogy to the Schmeiser scenario, 60 a farmer
that inadvertently possessed patented technology may be liable for
infringement but unable to cease the infringing activity without
permanently switching to GM crops. At present, common-law property
theories fail to fully protect inadvertent possessors' rights (farmers), or
shield them from costly patent infringement suits.161 On the other hand,
many proposed solutions for this developing problem, such as adding an
element of "intent" to infringement analyses, do not respect the rights of
patent holders and seek to severely limit patent holders' ability to protect
their interest. 6 2 The best solution is not in judicially-created doctrines,
common law property doctrines, or traditional patent defenses, but exists
plainly in the text of the notice requirement of the Patent Act.

159.
160.
161.
162.

Catechi, supra note 105, at 788.
See supra II.C.2 & III.C
Catechi, supra note 105, at 788.
Id.
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A. The Proposal:BroadApplication of the Notice Requirement
With the passage of the notice requirement in § 287 of the Patent Act,
the legislature provided limitations to the recovery of damages upon
determinations of patent infringement. At the most basic level, the purpose
of the statute is to encourage patent holders to notify the public that the
item is patented. Specifically, the "statutory duty is to prevent patent
owners from deceiving the public by distributing unmarked (and hence63
apparently copyable) articles which are in fact covered by a patent."'
This duty placed upon patent holders and licensees lessens the burden on
the alleged infringer to investigate whether any product in use might be
patented. The notice requirement provides patent holders and licensees
with two distinct methods of compliance: (1) patent marking, or (2) "actual
notice." The first method involves marking a patented product by affixing14
the word "patent" and the patent number on the item or its packaging.'
If the patent holder is unable to comply or simply chooses not to comply
with method, that is if the product's size does not permit marking, a
second method
allows the patent holder to give "actual notice" to the
65
infringer. 1
The language and purpose of the notice requirement was intended to
balance the rights of all interested parties. Unfortunately, the objective of
this requirement was somewhat diluted through inconsistent application
of the notice requirement by courts, which sometimes allowed minimal
"actual notice" from the patent holder to the alleged infringer.'66 This
article adopts a proposal, first introduced in a recent article by Catechi,
that the notice requirement be interpreted broadly to impose a duty upon
patent holders that choose against patent marking to: (1) provide clear and
sufficient "actual notice" identifying the patented technology and the

163. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03[7][c] (Matthew Bender 2004).
164. Catechi, supra note 105, at 789.
165. Id.
The duty that arises in the "actual notice" context is on the patent holder and
therefore it does not matter if the alleged infringer has actual knowledge of the
patent or even knew that he was infringing the patent... There are no steadfast
requirements for the content of the notice but it must be enough to give
notification of the patent alleged to be infringed, the alleged infringing conduct,
and in some circumstances, reasonable suggestions for compliance with the patent.
Id. at 789-90.
166. Id. at 790.
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infringing use; and (2) grant accused infringers a genuine opportunity to
cease inadvertent infringing use before a claim for infringement is filed. 67
1. The Application of the Proposed Rule to SKB v. Apotex
It is useful to consider how this rule might prove helpful in addressing
the problems faced by the courts when dealing with the issues presented
in Apotex. An equitable result could be achieved if we apply the proposed
interpretation of the notice requirement to the paroxetine context. 168
In this case, Apotex was legally manufacturing a drug, PHC anhydrate,
after the expiration of a patent covering the process. However, because
PHC anhydrate is automatically transformed into a more stable PHC
hemihydrate formulation through a seeding mechanism, Apotex was not
able to escape the production of this patented compound. Because PHC
hemihydrate is formed from an intermediate compound in a process claim,
SKB cannot satisfy the notice requirement by patent marking. Therefore,
SKB would be required to fulfill this obligation by the second form of
notice - "actual notice." This method would require SKB to provide
enough information
in the notice to allow the alleged infringer to cease
69
1
infringing.
If the notice requirement was considered when deliberating this case,
the court might have held the patent valid and allowed Apotex to continue
manufacturing the PHC anhydrate even though it inevitably and
unintentionally produced small amounts of PHC hemihydrate through
seeding.17° If, however, Apotex decided to sell the PHC hemihydrate or to
intentionally seed the anhydrous production process to create its own
hemihydrate pills, SKB could show that Apotex had proper notice,
nevertheless engaged in infringing activity, and is thus liable for
damages.' 71 "By intentionally seeding the environment, Apotex would
know it was producing a patented product and would also have the ability
to cease its intentional conduct [to avoid infringement]."' 72 The proposed
interpretation of the rule does not require any policy-driven balancing of
equity; instead it focuses on whether the alleged infringer has the
capability of avoiding infringement.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.at 798.
Catechi, supra note 105, at 798.
Id.
Id. at 799.
Id.
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2. The Proposed Rule is Consistent with the Patent Act and
Notice Requirement
The purpose of the Patent Act is to create a patent system to "promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries."' 7 3 The proposed rule promotes technological progress by
requiring patent holders to identify their patent and provide a clear means
by which they may enforce their monopoly against infringers. 74 Without
identification, innocent individuals may be found to unknowingly infringe
on a patent. Moreover, the proposal would make it easier for patentees or
assignees to identify who is infringing on the patent.
The purpose of the notice requirement is to prevent inadvertent
infringement. "Loose application of the notice requirement will undermine
[this] purpose... and [threatens to] read the rule out of existence. 1 75 The
proposed interpretation of the requirement, however, strengthens the notice
requirement. It does not eliminate or limit protections for nanotechnology
or GMO patent holders, but rather serves to balance the rights of the patent
holder and the potential inadvertent infringer in situations where
unidentifiable self-replicating products may spread outside the control of
those who possess it.
a. The Rights of the Potential Inadvertent Infringer
The application of this rule would protect individuals from unfair
liability that may arise when they inadvertently acquire patented
technology. It would relieve innocent possessors of patented technology
from infringement liability if they are found to be using a device without
a license. 76 Also, it would encourage patent holders to utilize existing
methods to control the long-term consequences of their technology, that
is by controlling the reproducibility of the nanotechnology or GMO, or by
incorporating visual markers that satisfy the "actual notice" method and
might aid in the identification of an acquired technology. 7 7 The latter
would allow a potential infringer to either: easily identify the alien
its removal; cease the use thereof, or, if desired,
technology and request 78
technology.
the
license

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 793.
Catechi, supranote 105, at 793.
Id.
Id. at792.
Id.
Id.
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b. The Rights of the Patent Holder
Patent holders rights are also protected by this doctrine because
compliance with the notice requirement allows them to more successfully
prosecute those that infringe their patents." 9 The proposed interpretation
of the notice requirement may impose stricter requirements upon patent
holders, but compliance with these requirements would promise more
predictable and successful decisions in infringement actions. This doctrine
would enable patent holders to prosecute infringers who espouse their
innocence while knowingly benefiting from the use of the patented
product. 180

3. The Proposed Rule is Economically Efficient
Under the current patent law, a patent holder may enforce his patent
against any individual that inadvertently or unknowingly acquired patented
technology. Because of the strict liability standard for patent infringement,
the infringer has an implied duty to invest in precautions to avoid
infringing and the patent holder is free of any such responsibility. Thus,
the infringer bears the economic burden while the patent holder gains the
economic benefit of the monopoly. Although placing the economic burden
solely on the infringer may be equitable and economically efficient for
traditional technology, this application of strict liability does not
evenhandedly transfer to the nanotechnology or GMO context. In these
contexts, the infringer is placed in an unequal position and bears too great
a burden to avoid infringing technology that may be both imperceptible
and uncontrollable.
If we consider the Schmeiser scenario for example, farmers that own
land adjacent to others that use Monsanto's technology would be required
to police their crops and invest in creating barriers around their property
lest they find themselves liable for infringement due to the drift of
patented technology. Given the characteristics of new technology, the
staunch application of current strict liability to nanotechnology would
produce an expected increase in inadvertent infringement litigation, hardly
an economically efficient result.' 8' The proposed interpretation, however,
provides a more equitable solution by rebalancing the economic burden in
particular contexts. The patent holder, generally the developer of a
technology, can control the spread and identification of the patented
179. Catechi, supra note 105, at 792.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 793.
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technology. Therefore, under the new notice doctrine, the patent holder
would be given a choice: control the spread or reproducibility of a device,
or develop a way to sufficiently identify a product to place passive
possessors on notice. The burden is thus placed on the party who is best
suited to control the item and is more cost effective. 182 This interpretation
would also provide a clear line to discourage litigation in this developing
controversy, and would allow patent holders, investors, and those seeking
patents to integrate additional § 287(a)-compliance costs into the
development of a product.'83
It may be argued that this rule does not comply with the fundamentals
of strict liability theory. Advocates of Positive Economic Theory may be
quick to point out that this new interpretation of the notice requirement it
incompatible with Posner's strict liability model. In Posner's unilateral
care model, the alleged infringer has the sole responsibility of avoiding
infringement and bearing the associated cost. But Posner himself noticed
the inequity of applying this standard to the context of inadvertent
infringement. And, in Apotex, he carved out an equitable defense theory
to prevent against inadvertent infringement, though it was ultimately
criticized and not adopted by the Federal Circuit.'84 But regardless of
possible noncompliance with Posner's strict liability theory, this
interpretation of the notice requirement fits within Calabresi's Cheapest
Cost-Avoider model since patent holders, in certain contexts, would be the
persons best suited to take measures to avoid infringement based on costbenefit analyses of accident risks.8 5
B. "Intent" as an Element of Infringement Fails to Protect the Interests
of the PatentHolder
A recent article by Preston suggested adding "intent" as an element of
the infringement analysis. Thus far however, the courts are unwilling to
entertain such radical changes to the patent doctrine. As one court put it,
"[i]t is, of course, elementary, that an infringement may be entirely
inadvertent and unintentional and without knowledge of the patent."' 86 As
such, patent infringement remains a strict liability offense. The same
article, however, proposed an alternate theory that would add an element
of "intent to acquire" when dealing with the limited context of self-

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 793-94.
Id.at 794.
See supra Part III.C.2.
See supra Part III.B.2.
Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.C. 1968).
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propagating organisms."S7 Preston justified this approach by highlighting
several distinguishing factors: "the type of infringement... ; the type of
patent[ed item] ...; the inappropriateness of an 'affirmative duty... on

the farmer to keep his property clear of GMO material'; and equitable
concerns ..."88 The approach to nanotechnology might parallel this
proposal. The problem with this solution, however, is that it may
eviscerate the rights of those who have patents in reproducible plants or
nanotechnology.1 9 Theoretically, a neighboring farmer may be able to
intentionally infringe a patent and escape liability if he can show that he
acquired the technology passively and without intent. In these
circumstances, patent holder's rights are vitiated since they would be
unable to prove "intent to acquire."
The Schmeiser court also addressed the issue of intent. The court
allowed intent to be used as a defense to the allegation that the infringing
farmer "used" the patented technology.1 9 ° If the farmer can produce
credible evidence to support an assertion that he did not "use" the patented
plant, then he may be able to escape liability. But despite proffering this
equitable escape, the Canadian court permitted such a defense to infringing
use on very few occasions.
Should the patent system adopt the "intent to acquire" proposal, the
rights of patent holders are minimized. On the other hand, if American
jurisprudence adopts the "intent to use" proposal espoused in Schmeiser,
innocent farmers would receive no more protection than exists under the
current law. Neither solution provides the balance necessary to protect the
interests of both patent holders and potential inadvertent infringers. 9 '
VI. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES: ASSERTING SECONDARY THEORIES OF
LIABILITY AND TORT ACTIONS AGAINST PATENT HOLDERS

Admittedly, there will be situations in which a strengthened notice
requirement fails to provide an appropriate remedy to inadvertent users of
patented technology. If manufacturers or owners of patented technology
market and distribute uncontrollable products, escaping infringement
liability hardly redresses any resulting injury, harm, or ecological damage
to unwitting possessors and users of the technology. Inadvertent

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Catechi, supra note 105, at 785.
Preston, supra note 19, at 1167.
Catechi, supra note 105, at 786.
Monsanto Canada, Inc. v.Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 S.C.C. 34 (Can.).
Catechi, supra note 105, at 786.
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infringement is not an issue with traditional technology - users of patented
technology are found liable for affirmatively engaging in infringing
activity either knowingly or after misconstruing the scope of patented
technology. 92 As such, the court has not considered whether second
liability theories or tort liability against manufacturers might supercede
patent protections. But new technologies, such as nanotechnology and selfpropagating GMOs, necessitate reconsidering this issue and raise a host of
unprecedented safety concerns. 9 3 An action in damages against the
manufacturer of the technology may be the most satisfactory solution if an
inadvertent user is harmed, and it puts the burden for loss on those who
have profited most.
The following discussion will address possible causes of action in tort
that might be counterclaimed against patent holders in an infringement
action or raised in a separate negligence suits.
A. Tort Liability Theories
1. The Law of Stray Animals
In a recent article, Kershen suggests applying the common-law doctrine
of stray animals to the uncontrollable spread of technology. 94 Specifically,
this author proposes that airborne transgenic pollen be likened to a stray
animal that has entered a neighboring landowner's property. In such
situations, the law grants the landowner a legal right to act from necessity
to protect person and property from damages caused by a roving animal's
trespass,' 95 the landowner has no obligation to suffer patiently and
passively as the damage occurs. If the farmer seizes the animal while
acting to prevent damages, he gains a common law right of distraint to
hold the animal until damage to his property is paid for by the animal's
owner. However, the landowner does not gain an ownership right to the
animal and is liable for conversion if he exercises ownership rights over
the animal.' 96 If, however, a stray animal, such as a bull, comes on the
192. 35 U.S.C. § 271.
193. Wikipedia, Grey Goo, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greygoo (stating "Grey goo is a
hypothetical end-of-the-world scenario involving molecular nanotechnology in which out of control
self-replicating robots consume all living matter on Earth while building more of themselves," a
process which has been termed global ecophagy. A variant of this is "green goo," a scenario in
which nanotechnology creates self-replicating nano-machines which consume all organic particles,
living or dead, creating a slime-like nonliving organic mass) (as of Dec. 6, 2007, 15:20 EST).
194. Kershen, supra note 120, at 592-93.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 594.
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landowner's neighboring property and impregnates a cow, the resulting
offspring is said to be the property of the landowner.1 97
Applying these legal rules to the contexts of reproducible
nanotechnology and transgenic crops, individuals that inadvertently
acquired technology which has reproduced by association with owned
property may be said to possess an ownership interest in the reproduced
device or organism. 98 For example, consider the example of the
inadvertent user of a passively acquired nano-robot that clears away
atherosclerotic plaques. If this nano-robot self-replicated by using its
host's atoms, the law of stray animals may permit the resulting nano-robot
to be the property of the inadvertent user. It must be emphasized, however,
that while the inadvertent user has ownership rights to the tangible nanorobot, ownership rights to the intangible intellectual property contained
within it remain with the patent holder.' 99 To determine infringement,
courts would have to distinguish between these types of ownership. The
inadvertent user claiming ownership of the nano-robot would "claim
protection against infringement by presenting the affirmative defense of
implied license."2 °° In this context, the implied license is analogous to a
"shop right" in the nanotechnology technology developed by the patent
holder. The inadvertent user may use the technology, but is prohibited
from making, selling, or assigning his limited right to it.
2. Liability Under Strict Products Liability
Strict liability is the dominant theory of liability under products
liability. Strict liability, or a similar action under breach of implied
warranty of merchantability, can be asserted by plaintiffs in 45 states and
three U.S. territories (D.C., Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands). 2 1 As a general
rule, manufacturers and producers of products have a duty to: "exercise
due care in the design of products; to research, make and sell the product
safely; and to warn of defects and dangers to consumers or users. ,212
Producers that create products with defect may be held strictly liable
without negligence. The Restatement (Third) of Torts states that: "One
engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who

197. Catechi, supra note 105, at 787.
198. Kershen, supra note 120, at 602-03.
199. Id.at 604.
200. Id.
201. Brady Montalbano, It's Not Easy Being Green-HoldingManufacturers of Genetically
ModifiedBentgrassLiable Under StrictProductsLiability, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 111, 119

(2005).
202. Id.at 120.
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sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to
persons or property caused by the defect."2 3 In order to prevail on a claim
of strict products liability, a plaintiff must prove the following elements:
(1) the product contains a defect which is unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer; (2) the defect existed when the product left the
manufacturer; and (3) the defect proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. 2° '
"Unreasonably dangerous" is defined by the Restatement as being
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics. '"205 To establish the
first prong of the analysis, plaintiffs generally claim either a failure to
warn (inadequate warning) 206 or a design defect.2 7 In the case of
nanotechnology and GMOs, it may be argued that their very nature
contains a design defect. These technologies are unreasonably dangerous
because they can spread uncontrollably and discreetly to injure inadvertent
users who cannot avoid harm through reasonable care.
To meet the second element of a products liability claim, the plaintiff
must prove the injury was caused by a product. Product is defined broadly
as anything that has been introduced into the stream of commerce by a
person or entity. Typically, this requirement is satisfied by any product
sold "in the condition or substantially the same condition in which it is
expected to reach the ultimate consumer or user., 20 8 Self-replicating nanodevices and GMOs sold to the consuming public would clearly fulfill this
requirement of strict products liability. These products are in fixed states
when produced, but are inherently dangerous when used because of they
not be containable or perceivable.
Finally, the last prong that must be established is that the defect
proximately caused plaintiffs injury.20 9 If the inadvertent use of
nanotechnology or transgenic technology injured the inadvertent user,

203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIlTY § 1 cmt. a (1998); Farnese, supra
note 82, at 21.
204. Montalbano, supra note 201, at 120.
205. See Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 116 N.H. 52, 54 (1976) (court interpretation of
"unreasonably dangerous" as defined in RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (THIRD) § 1 (1998)).
206. Montalbano, supra note 201, at 122 ("A product that is unreasonably dangerous must
contain a warning or direction disclosing information concerning the danger that an ordinary
consumer may not know or reasonably expect to know.").
207. Id. at 122-23 ("A product has a design defect when 'the specific product unit conforms
to its intended design but the intended design itself... renders the product not reasonably safe.').
208. Id. at 121.
209. Id. at 123.
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whether by costs expended removing the technology or by irreparable
harm resulting from its use, the final prong may be satisfied.
3. Negligence
Unlike the strict liability theories described above, negligence is a
fault-based tort system that imposes a legal duty to act in a prescribed
manner in particular circumstances. A negligence claim may be asserted
if a plaintiff can prove the following elements: (1) the defendant had a
duty to protect the plaintiff from injury; (2) the defendant breached that
legal duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss; and (4) the loss
or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty.21°
If defendant is under a legal duty to act as a reasonable and prudent person
and this duty is breached so as to cause damages to others or their
property, liability results. al
Several characteristics unique to nanotechnology and transgenic crops
may be asserted to counterclaim negligence in defense to patent
infringement, including: (1) the heightened potential for inadvertent
infringement given the microscopic size of nanotechnology; (2) the
possibility that an individual may be found to infringe based on passive
acquisition and unintentional use of proprietary technology; and (3) the
potential for a patent holder to contribute to infringing activity by failing
212
to integrate means to control the spread of self-propagating devices.
With respect to these non-traditional technologies, a negligence claim
could be brought by a person claiming personal damage from an
uncontrolled nanotechnology, or damage to non-GMO crops by genetic
drift. Because patent holders of nanotechnology patents may exert
considerable influence over the infringement of nano-patents and may be
the cheapest cost avoiders, the patent community should embrace the
"joint care" concept of negligence. As such, if the patent holder's failure
to implement control results in damages based on an inadvertent infringing
use of patented technology, the innocent infringer should be able to assert
negligence to defeat a claim of patent infringement.
4. Nuisance
An action in nuisance is a claim of unreasonable and substantial
interference with the private use and enjoyment of real property caused by

210. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 21 (2007).
211. McEowen, supra note 118, at 621.
212. See supraIII.C.
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damage to another's land, health, comfort, or convenience.1 3 This cause
is generally asserted against large industrial plants that produce
environmental waste, but has most recently been asserted against
biotechnology companies that produce transgenic crops that may
contaminate neighboring crops through "genetic drift."2'14
Although difficult to prove causation under this tort theory, individuals
that suffer demonstrable physical harm based on inadvertent possession or
use of patented technology may bring this cause of action against the
manufacturers of such dangerous and uncontrolled technology. However,
it may be difficult to obtain a satisfactory judgment under this statute
because courts are more receptive to nuisance suits when there is
substantial physical damage to the plaintiffs property versus mere
complaints that relate to interference with plaintiffs comfort or
convenience. 21 Therefore, in the case of the aforementioned nano-robot,
courts are more likely to award damages under strict products liability than
nuisance for the inconvenience of removing the patented device.
B. Hoffman and Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada
The issue of responsibility for inadvertent infringement is not yet
resolved. Patent holders attempt to place the responsibility on those that
inadvertently acquire patented technology, and use patent infringement
suits as their ultimate weapon. 16 But recognition of the potentially
hazardous effects of unbridled technology leaves many dissatisfied with
a conclusion that holds inadvertent possessors liable for patent
infringement, particularly where they suffer measurable harm.
In an attempt to put responsibility for uncontrolled technology on
patent holders or manufacturers that sell such technology, a class action,
Hoffman andBeaudoinv. Monsanto Canada,is before a Canadian court.217
Two certified farmers brought this case on behalf of approximately 1000
organic grain farmers in Saskatchewan against two biotechnology
companies for damages resulting from the widespread contamination of
their crops by GM canola and for an injunction to prevent the commercial
introduction of GM wheat.2" 8 These farmers allege that widespread
§ 822 (1979); see also HAGUE YEARBOOK OF
(ed. Johan Lammers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2000).
214. See infra Part VI.B.
215. Glenn, supra note 51, at 554.
216. Id. at 549. The best-known example is Monsanto's action against natural canola-grower
Schmeiser. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 550.
213.
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contamination of their crops by GM canola has left "few, if any, certified
organic grain farmers.,, 219 The plaintiffs claim that Monsanto is liable in:
1) negligence, for breaching their duty to (a) ensure that their GM canola
would not infiltrate and contaminate farmland, (b) warn growers about the
danger of cross-pollination, and (c) advise growers of farming practices
that would limit the spread of GM canola; 2) nuisance, by interfering with
non-GMO farmers use and enjoyment of their land through the
introduction of GM canola; 3) strict liability, for engaging in a non-natural
use of land and inviting mischief and damage; and 4) trespass,
for
22
introducing and subsequently releasing GM canola uncontrollably.
No decision on the merits has been reached since the case has yet to
come to trial; however, the case is described as a potential "tidal wave"
with regard to patent infringement.221
VII. CONCLUSION
The rise of new forms of technology compels reconsideration and
reconstruction of the applicability of strict liability in patent law. The
current strict liability regime, which is sufficient to deter free-riding and
wasteful economic activity when applied to traditional forms of
technology, may fail to provide equitable or economic solutions when
applied to the nanotechnology and biotechnology industries. The unique
characteristics of technology in these industries, particularly the atomic
size and potential uncontrollable nature, upsets the balance between the
monopoly rights of patent holders and the rights of consumers or users to
identify patented products; a shift that will inevitably lead to increased
litigation. In particular, the current notice requirements fail to protect
inadvertent possessors from liability that arises when they innocently and
passively acquire patented technology.
As has been noted, one solution to this problem is to explore tort
theories of negligence and strict liability against patentees of potentially
dangerous technology. Presently, no common law or statutory bar prevents
patentees from being held legally responsible for their inventions. The
traditional policy of rewarding inventors for their inventions, and thus
shielding them from liability, may no longer be justifiable given the
changing nature of technology. But, while inadvertent infringers may be
able to assert property and tort doctrines as a coextensive remedy against

219. Id.
220. Glenn, supra note 51, at 551.
221. Id.at 550.
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patentees of uncontrolled technology, there is no authority to suggest these
doctrines are defenses to patent infringement.
Ultimately, the best solution lies in reinvigorating the notice
requirement, section 287(a), of the Patent Act. Patent holders should be
required to provide potential infringers not only with prior notice of
infringing use, but an opportunity to discontinue such activity before
infringement is found even where damages may not be awarded.
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